Australian Army in World War II

The Australian Army was the largest service in the Australian military during World War II and was deployed to many parts of the world.

Contents

Background

Prior to the outbreak of war the Australian Army was split into the small full-time Permanent Military Forces (PMF) and the larger part-time Citizen Military Forces (CMF). The Army's strength in September 1939 was 2,800 full-time soldiers and 80,000 members of the CMF. The CMF had been expanded from a strength of 35,000 during 1938 and 1939, and the PMF's main responsibility was to administer and train it.[1] The Defence Act restricted the pre-war Army to service in Australia and its territories.[2]

During the 1930s the Australian Army's organisation, equipment and doctrine were similar to those of World War I. The CMF was organised into infantry and horse-mounted cavalry divisions and fixed coastal fortifications at strategic ports. While the Army recognised that there was a threat of war with Japan, little had been done to prepare for the jungle warfare this would involve. The Army followed the trends in the British Army as it modernised in the late 1930s, but was unable to obtain the up to date equipment needed to properly implement the new British doctrines and organisations. Nevertheless, the CMF provided a pool of experienced officers and soldiers who could be used to expand the Army in the event of war,[3] and indeed during the course of the war about 200,000 CMF soldiers volunteered for overseas service.[4]

Organisation

Australia entered World War II on 3 September 1939. On 14 September Prime Minister Robert Menzies announced that 40,000 members of the CMF would be called up for training and a 20,000-strong expeditionary force, designated the Second Australian Imperial Force (AIF), would be formed for overseas service. Like the First Australian Imperial Force, the Second AIF was a volunteer force formed by establishing entirely new units. The Government also introduced conscription in October 1939 to keep the CMF at strength as its members volunteered for the AIF, with all unmarried men turning 21 being liable for three months training.[2]

The first AIF units to be formed were grouped as the 6th Division. This was an infantry division and initially comprised twelve infantry battalions with supporting artillery, armoured cavalry, engineer and logistics and communication units. An early problem was whether to adopt the British or Australian organisation. In 1939 the British Army was in the process of re-equipping with new weapons, which called for a new organisation. This new equipment was not available in Australia, so it was decided to organise the 6th Division with some elements of the old twelve-battalion organisation and some of the new.[5]

Three further AIF infantry divisions were formed during 1940, with the 7th Division being established February 1940 and the 8th Division and 9th Division following in May and June.[6] Second AIF units were often raised from volunteers from certain areas and were given the same numbers as First AIF units from those areas but with the prefix '2/'.[6] An AIF corps headquarters, designated I Corps, was formed in March 1940 along with its support units.[7] The final AIF division to be formed was the 1st Armoured Division, which was established in July 1941. Twelve AIF commando companies and many corps, support and service units were also raised during the war.[8]

The AIF's requirements for manpower and equipment constrained the CMF during the early years of the war.[9] At the outbreak of the Pacific War the main Army units in Australia were five CMF infantry divisions, two CMF cavalry divisions and the AIF 1st Armoured Division.[10] The Volunteer Defence Corps, which was a part time volunteer force based on the British Home Guard, was also available for local defence.[11] At this time only 30 percent of CMF units were on full-time duty, with the remainder periodically undertaking three month-long mobilisations.[12] The CMF was also poorly armed, and there was insufficient equipment to be issued to all units if they were mobilised.[13] In response to the Japanese threat the Army was forced to move units between CMF divisions so that the most combat-ready could be sent to areas believed to be under the greatest threat of attack.[14]

The Army was considerably expanded in early 1942 in response to the Japanese threat to Australia. During this year the Army's strength peaked at eleven infantry divisions and three armoured divisions as well as many support and service units. This force was larger than what Australia's population and industry could sustain, however, and the Government began reducing its strength in the second half of the year.[15] Most of the units which were disbanded were CMF, and by September 1943 the AIF had 265,000 members compared to just over 117,000 in the CMF.[16] CMF units were able to serve outside of Australian territory in the South-West Pacific Area from January 1943 after the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Act 1943 was passed, though the 11th Brigade was the only major unit to do so.[17] The Army's strength was further reduced by 100,000 members from October 1943 in order to free up manpower to work in industry.[18] At the end of 1943 the Government determined that the Army's strength was to be six infantry divisions and two armoured brigades, though further reductions were ordered in August 1944 and June 1945.[19] The Army was still one of the largest Allied armies as a proportion of population at the end of the war.[20]

The demands of combat during World War II led to changes in the composition of Army units. The success of German mechanised units during the invasions of Poland and France convinced Australian defence planners and the Government that the Army required armoured units, and these began to be raised in 1941 when the 1st Armoured Division was formed. The two CMF cavalry divisions were first motorised and then converted into armoured divisions in 1942 and the 3rd Army Tank Brigade was formed to provide support to the infantry. These large armoured units were not suitable for jungle warfare, however, and most were disbanded during 1943 and 1944.[21] Conditions in the South West Pacific also led the Army to convert its six combat divisions to 'jungle divisions' in early 1943 and 1944. This organisation, which had fewer heavy weapons, vehicles and support units then the British-pattern organisation previously used, proved only moderately successful, because the conditions that it was designed for did not recur.[22] As a result, the divisions were strengthened for their 1944–45 campaigns by returning the artillery and anti-tank units which had been removed.[23]

Campaigns

Leadership

When the war began the Army was on the cusp of a generational change. At the time, the senior officer on the active list were Major General Gordon Bennett and Major General Thomas Blamey, although Bennett had not held an appointment for seven years and Blamey for the last two. Then came then the Chief of the General Staff, Major General John Lavarack; the Adjutant General, Major General Sir Carl Jess; Major General Owen Phillips, the Quartermaster General; Major General Edmund Drake-Brockman, the commander of the 3rd Division; and Major General Iven Mackay, the commander 2nd Division. All were over 50 years of age and all except Bennett, Drake-Brockman and Mackay were serving or former regular soldiers. Only the first three were considered to command the 6th Division and Second AIF, for which posts Blamey was selected by Prime Minister Menzies. Both Blamey and Lavarack were promoted to lieutenant general on 13 October 1939.[24]

The next most senior regular officers, all colonels, included men like Vernon Sturdee, Henry Wynter and John Northcott, all of whom had joined the Army before the First World War. These officers held senior commands throughout the war, but seldom active ones. Below them were a distinct group of regular officers, graduates of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, which had opened in 1911. Their number included Frank Berryman, William Bridgeford, Cyril Clowes, Horace Robertson, Sydney Rowell and George Alan Vasey. These officers had fought in the First World War and reached the rank of major, but their promotion prospects were restricted and they remained majors for twenty years. Many left the Army to join the British or Indian armies, or the RAAF, or to return to civilian life. As a group, they had become embittered and resentful, and determined to prove that they could lead troops in battle.[25] Many regular officers had attended training courses or been on exchange with the British Army, which was important in the early years of the war when there was close cooperation between the two armies.[26]

Between the wars, the reservists enjoyed better much promotion prospects. While Alan Vasey, a major in the First AIF, was not promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel until 1937, Kenneth Eather, a reservist who was too young to serve in the First world War, was commissioned in 1923 and promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1935. Menzies ordered that all commands in the 6th Division be given to reservists rather than regular officers,[27] who had become political adversaries through their outspoken opposition to the Singapore Strategy.[28] Appointments therefore went to reservists like Stanley Savige, Arthur Allen, Leslie Morshead and Edmund Herring.[29] Later other militia officers rose to prominence as brigade and division commanders. The distinguished records of officers like Heathcote Howard Hammer,[30] Ivan Dougherty,[31] David Whitehead, Victor Windeyer and Selwyn Porter would challenge the regular officers' contention that they had a special claim to senior command ability.[32][33]

Initially, battalion commanders tended to be older reservists, some of whom had commanded battalions in the First AIF. Only one battalion command in 1939 or 1940 went to a regular officer. As the war went on the average age of battalion commanders declined from 42.9 in 1940 to 35.6 in 1945.[34] By 1945, half of all senior appointments would be held by regular officers, although they would still be under-represented in unit commands.[35] In 1945, there was still only one infantry battalion commanded by a regular officer.[34]

Around the time of the outbreak of war with Japan, many senior officers with distinguished records in the Middle East were recalled to Australia to lead militia formations and fill important staff posts.[36] Because the Army reached its greatest extent in 1942 and shrank in size thereafter, Blamey was faced with a limited number of senior appointments and more senior officers than he needed to fill them. He faced public and political criticism over "shelving" senior officers.[37] This affected prospects for more junior officers as well. Of the 52 officers promoted to the substantive rank of lieutenant colonel in the last six months of 1944 only five were infantrymen, while two were engineers, and 45 were in the services.[38]

Equipment

The Australian Army generally had a long-standing policy of using British-designed equipment, but equipment from Australia, the United States and some other countries was introduced into service in the war's later years.[39] Pre-war defence policies favoured the Royal Australian Navy, which received the majority of defence dollars in the interwar period.[40] The result was that when war came in 1939, the Army's equipment was of World War I vintage, and Australian factories were only capable of producing small arms. Most equipment was obsolescent and had to be replaced, and new factories were required to produce the latest weapons, equipment and motor vehicles. Some 2,860 motor vehicles and motorcycles suitable for military use were purchased in 1939 for the Militia and another 784 for the 6th Division, but since a division's war establishment was around 3,000, so this was enough for training only. In February 1940, the Treasury urged the War Cabinet to slow orders of motor vehicles to save the shipping space used for sending them to the Middle East for wheat cargoes.[41]

Australian infantry units were largely equipped with British-designed but largely Australian-made small arms and support weapons. The standard rifle was the SMLE No 1 Mk III*, manufactured since 1912 at the Lithgow Small Arms Factory. During the course of World War II, Australian infantry units utilised the Lee-Enfield No.4 MkI/MkI* rifle (many of which were made by Long Branch Arsenal in Canada and Savage-Stevens Firearms in the US) in small quantities in New Guinea (most of these rifles were provided to other branches of the Australian military and to the Volunteer Defence Corps in order to free up No.1 MkIII* rifles for frontline infantry units). Some Australian infantry units attached to US Army units in New Guinea were armed with American-made M1 Garand semi-automatic rifles. The Vickers machine gun was also produced there from 1929. The Bren Gun replaced Lewis Gun as the standard automatic rifle in the early years of the war. Their manufacture in Australia started in 1941.[42] The American Thompson submachine gun was introduced and replaced by the Australian-designed Owen Gun and the British-designed but Australian-modified and -made Austen submachine gun.[43] Infantry platoons were also equipped with M36 grenades. The Boys anti-tank rifle was the standard infantry anti-tank weapon at the start of the war, but was replaced with the PIAT in 1943. The heavier support weapons used by infantry battalions the war included the 2-inch mortar and Stokes 3-inch mortar. Infantry battalions were also equipped with Universal Carriers until being converted to the tropical warfare establishment in 1943. A man-pack flamethrower was also introduced in 1945.[44]

Not until 17 January 1940 did Richard Casey obtain Cabinet's approval to spend £400,000 to construct a plant to manufacture 25 pounder field guns and 2 pounder anti-tank guns.[41] Until the 25 pounder could become available in quantity, units in Australia and the Far East were equipped with the old 18 pounder. Some units in the Middle East operated the 18/25 pounder, an 18 pounder that had been re-bored to take 25 pounder ammunition, until they received British 25 pounders. The old 4.5 inch howitzer also saw service, with the 2/10th Field Regiment employing them in support of the 9th Division during the Siege of Tobruk. A collection of captured Italian guns were also employed, known as the "Bush Artillery".[45] These were rendered obsolete when the 25 pounder became available in quantity. Eventually, 1,527 were manufactured in Australia.[46] A special light weight version known as the Short 25 pounder was developed for jungle warfare.[47] The requirement for a portable field piece in mountainous jungle led to the use of the 3.7 inch Mountain Howitzer in the New Guinea Campaign. The American 75 mm Pack Howitzer M1 was also employed.[47] Experience in the Western Desert Campaign soon showed that the 2 pounder could not deal with German tanks, and it was superseded by the 6 pounder, which began coming off the assembly lines in Australia in July 1942. In turn it was replaced in 1944 by the 17 pounder, which was manufactured at the Maribyrnong Ordnance Factory.[48] The anti-aircraft artillery were equipped with the Swedish-designed Bofors 40 mm gun, which was manufactured in Australia,[49] and the British 3.7 inch Ainti-Aircraft gun.[50] Medium artillery included the American 155 mm Long Tom and the British 5.5 inch gun.[51]

The need for tanks to equip armoured units led the War Cabinet to approve the manufacture of the Sentinel tank in 1940.[52] Some 66 of them were delivered by the time manufacture ceased in July 1943, but none was used in action.[53] Otherwise tanks were sources from overseas. The first shipment of M3 Stuart light tanks arrived in September 1941. The first shipment of British Matilda II tanks arrived in July 1942, and these proved to be the most suitable type for jungle warfare. A flame-thrower variant was produced and saw action in the Borneo campaign. The most numerous tank used by the Australian Army was the M3 Lee. Several hundred of these equipped the armoured divisions, but unlike the Stuarts and Matildas, they did not see action.[54] An Australian scout car known as the Dingo[55] was produced as an interim measure until adequate supplies of the Canadian Staghound armoured car became available in 1944. The Australian Army also operated some amphibious tractors.[56]

The Australian Army developed its own landing craft. Development of an Australian version of the Landing Craft Assault, the ALCV (Australian Landing Craft, Vehicle), was carried out by Army personnel working alongside the Ford Motor Company. Prototypes were constructed by sappers and launched on the Brisbane River. The initial version, known as the ALCV I was found to be too small, so the larger 12-metre ALCV II was developed. An Australian version of the Landing Craft Mechanized, the ALCM, was also developed and manufactured by Ford in Brisbane and later at Geelong. Operational experience demonstrated the need for larger landing craft, so the ALCV III, an enlarged version of the ALCM II with four Ford V8 engines and twice the cargo capacity, was produced. The Army also ordered 15 ALCM IIIs, a type of similar capacity to an American Landing Craft Tank, with five Ford V8 engines. Only four were delivered before the end of the war, which saw service in New Guinea.[57][58]

By 1945, due to a shrinking number of operational units and stepped up production, equipment shortages were a thing of the past. The Army required 368 25 pounders for combat and 38 for training but it had 1,516. The Army needed 530 2 pounder and 6 pounder anti-tank guns and had 1,941. The Army required 68 3.7 inch anti-aircraft guns for combat and five for training and had 640. The Army required 9,438 Brens guns and had 21,139, and it needed 123 Bren gun carriers but had 3,767.[59]

Training and doctrine

The Australian Army's pre-war doctrine was focused on conventional warfare in a European environment. This doctrine and the supporting training manuals were common to those of all Commonwealth countries. Following the outbreak of war the Army continued to focus on preparing its units to fight in Europe and North Africa.[60] By far the single greatest difficulty in training in the early war years was the shortage of equipment.[61] However, there were also critical shortages of instructors. The decision to form the 1st Armoured Division created a requirement for large numbers of highly skilled personnel,[62] but there were few officers and men with the required skills in the small pre-war Army and many of them were already serving in the AIF's divisional mechanised cavalry regiments.[63] An Armoured Fighting Vehicles School was created at Puckapunyal, Victoria in 1941.[64] The Armoured Corps Training Centre moved there in March 1943.[65]

Another problem for the Militia was a lack of continuity in the training. When the war began, men were called up for only one month's additional training. This was then increased to three months' additional training. In 1940–41, officers and non-commissioned officers were intensively trained for 18 to 24 days, after which there was a camp for 70 days. The men who had been through the 90 day training regimen in 1939–40 were given 12 days' additional training while those who had not completed the full 70 days. This allowed for individual training, but prevented proper unit training. In July 1941, soldiers who had completed 90 days' training became liable for three months' training per year while new recruits were liable for six months. At the same time, the War Cabinet provided for more intensive training for the full-time cadre of Militia units, which were not to exceed 25% of the unit's strength.[66]

Although the Army's focus was on conventional warfare, in late 1940 Lieutenant Colonel J . C. Mawhood, a British officer, arrived in Australia with a small specialist staff to conduct training in unconventional warfare. A school, known as No. 7 Infantry Training Centre, was opened at Wilsons Promontory, Victoria, "an isolated area of high, rugged and heavily timbered mountains, precipitous valleys, swiftly running streams, and swamps." The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Independent Companies and a nucleus of the 4th were raised by October 1941 when training was discontinued. After the outbreak of the war with Japan, the school was reopened as the Guerilla Warfare School, the training of the 4th company was completed and five more companies were formed.[67]

The Australian Army did not have any doctrine for jungle warfare prior to 1942.[68] Some lessons were passed on by officers who escaped from Malaya and Singapore, however, and these were incorporated into a training memorandum in May that year. AIF units which returned from North Africa undertook some training in jungle tactics before going into action,[60] but the CMF units which initially faced the Japanese in New Guinea suffered from inadequate training, and this led to them suffering heavy casualties.[69]

In order to be able to move troops to the front in New Guinea more rapidly, to acclimatise them during the process, and to allow more realistic of large formation in jungle and mountainous but Malaria-free terrain, General Blamey decided to establish a training and staging area on the Atherton Tableland in November 1942. Eventually, accommodation was provided there for 70,000 troops. As divisions returned from tours of duty in New Guinea in 1943 and 1944, they were sent to Atherton for anti-Malaria treatment. The men then went on leave, after which they returned to Atherton where training was conducted before staging and departing again.[70]

In early 1943 the Army developed a jungle warfare doctrine by adapting the pre-war field service regulations to meet the conditions in the South-West Pacific. The Army's front-line combat formations were reorganised and trained in accordance with this doctrine during the year.[71] A jungle warfare school was opened at Canungra, Queensland in November 1942, and all reinforcements for combat units subsequently passed through the school before joining their unit.[72] Canungra consist of a reinforcement training centre, an Independent Company training centre, and a tactical school. With the establishment of Canungra the Independent Company training centre on Wilson 's Promontory was closed.[73]

Over time, training programs included greater cooperation between the Army's combat arms and with the other services.[74] A Combined Training Centre, also known as HMAS Assault, opened on 1 September 1942 at Nelson Bay, near Port Stephens, New South Wales, as a central establishment for the training staffs, beach parties and small boat crews.[75] In July 1942, a Combined Training School was established at Bribie Island Queensland and nearby Toorbul Point for Army units.[76] During 1944, combined training with the RAAF and RAN was also carried out at Trinity Beach, near Cairns.

The Australian Army began training parachutists in December 1942 as an offshoot of the training of Independent Companies. The 1st Parachute Battalion was formed in March 1943. It reached full strength by January 1944, but, although it was warned for action a number of times, it did not see any. After the war it participated in the reoccupation of Singapore.[77]

By 1945 the Army possessed a comprehensive schools system, with 40 schools of various kinds. Between 1942 and 1945 96,000 training courses were conducted. The Officer Cadet Training Unit had trained 7,887 officers by August 1945.[78] Unlike the First AIF, newly-commissioned lieutenants were not sent back to their original unit, but were posted to the first vacancy.[79] Other schools included the School of Artillery, the Guerrilla Warfare School, the Cooking and Catering School, the School of Military Law and the School of Movement and Transport. Recruit training was now thorough and exacting, and for infantrymen culminated in a jungle training course at Canungra, where the Jungle Warfare School turned out 4,000 reinforcements a month.[78] In 1945, the 29th Infantry Brigade received 1,000 young reinforcements shortly before embarking for Torokina, but their commander later remarked that their training at Canungra had been so thorough that they "reacted with almost miraculous quickness to conditions of battle."[80]

Casualties

The Australian Army suffered the following casualties during the war:[81]

War against Germany War against Japan Total
Operational areas
Battle casualties
Killed in action 2,688 8,635 11,323
Died of wounds 701 1,093 1,794
DOW while prisoner of war 55 48 103
Died of disease while POW 95 5,360 5,455
Total killed 3,539 15,136 18,675
POWs escaped, recovered or repatriated 7,055 13,865 20,920
Wounded (cases) 8,578 13,275 21,853
Total battle casualties 19,172 42,276 61,448
Non-battle casualties
Killed/died of injury 352 736 1,088
Wounds and injuries 9,196 24,000 33,196
In Australia Overseas
Non-operational areas
Killed/died of injuries or accidents 1,795 1,795
Wounds and injuries 121,800 121,800

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Johnston (2007), p. 4
  2. ^ a b Johnston (2007), p. 5
  3. ^ Kuring (2004), pp. 106–107
  4. ^ Johnston (2007), p. 9.
  5. ^ Long (1952), pp. 50–51
  6. ^ a b Johnston (2007), p. 6
  7. ^ Johnston (2007), p. 7
  8. ^ Palazzo (2001), p. 145
  9. ^ Palazzo (2001), p. 146
  10. ^ Kuring (2004), p. 138
  11. ^ Dennis et al (2008). pp. 558–559
  12. ^ Palazzo (2001), p. 147
  13. ^ Palazzo (2001), p. 148
  14. ^ Palazzo (2001), p. 150
  15. ^ Palazzo (2001), p. 174
  16. ^ Palazzo (2001), p. 152
  17. ^ Palazzo (2001), p. 153
  18. ^ Palazzo (2001), p. 175
  19. ^ Palazzo (2001), p. 177
  20. ^ Johnston (2007), p. 10
  21. ^ Palazzo (2001), pp. 178–183
  22. ^ Palazzo (2001), pp. 183–186
  23. ^ Johnston (2007), pp. 12–13
  24. ^ Long 1952, pp. 43–44
  25. ^ Horner 1992, pp. 32–35
  26. ^ Long 1952, p. 50
  27. ^ Long 1952, p. 45
  28. ^ Long 1952, pp. 22–23
  29. ^ Long 1952, pp. 47–48
  30. ^ Dexter 1961, p. 114
  31. ^ Dexter 1961, p. 423
  32. ^ Coates 1999, p. 28
  33. ^ Grey 2001, pp. 199–200
  34. ^ a b Grey 1992, p. 81
  35. ^ Grey 1992, p. 74
  36. ^ McCarthy 1959, p. 13
  37. ^ Long 1963, pp. 57, 70–71
  38. ^ Long 1963, p. 81
  39. ^ Long (1952), p. 7
  40. ^ Long (1952), pp. 9–14
  41. ^ a b Long (1952), pp. 40–41
  42. ^ Mellor (1958), pp. 322–323
  43. ^ Mellor (1958), pp. 325–332
  44. ^ Kuring (2004), p. 204
  45. ^ Gower (1981) pp. 72–73
  46. ^ Gower (1981) p. 82
  47. ^ a b Gower (1981) pp. 92–94
  48. ^ Mellor (1958), pp. 240–241
  49. ^ Mellor (1958), pp. 241–242
  50. ^ Horner (1995), p. 224
  51. ^ Gower (1981) pp. 214–217
  52. ^ Mellor (1958), pp. 301–302
  53. ^ Mellor (1958), p. 319
  54. ^ Hopkins (1993), pp. 61–65, 73
  55. ^ Spoelstra, Hanno. "Car, Armoured (Aust), LP4 4x4 All-Wheel Drive Conversion Kits". Marmon-Herrington Military Vehicles. http://www.marmon-herrington.webs.com/armdcar.html#dingo. 
  56. ^ Hopkins (1993), pp. 71–73
  57. ^ McNicoll (1979), pp. 300–307
  58. ^ Mellor (1958), pp. 476–478
  59. ^ Long (1963), pp. 36–37
  60. ^ a b Moremon (2000)
  61. ^ Grey (2001), p. 130
  62. ^ Hopkins (1993), p. 39
  63. ^ Grey (2001), p. 126
  64. ^ Hopkins (1993), pp. 40–47
  65. ^ Hopkins (1993), p. 126
  66. ^ McCarthy (1959), p. 2
  67. ^ McCarthy (1959), p. 85
  68. ^ Moremon (2004), p. 76
  69. ^ Moremon (2004), pp. 82–83
  70. ^ Dexter, p. 228
  71. ^ Moremon (2004), pp. 79–80
  72. ^ Moremon (2004), p. 81
  73. ^ Dexter (1963), p. 228
  74. ^ Moremon (2004), p. 85
  75. ^ Gill (1968), p. 171
  76. ^ Gill (1968), p. 277
  77. ^ Long (1963), p. 554
  78. ^ a b Long (1963), p. 72
  79. ^ Long (1963), p. 77
  80. ^ Long (1963), p. 98
  81. ^ Beaumont (2001), pp. 122–123

References